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Abstract 
China’s fast economic growth contributes to the rapid development of its urbanization process, and also renders a 
series of industrial accidents, which often cause loss of life, damage to property and environment, thus requiring the 
associated risk analysis and safety control measures to be implemented in advance. However, incompleteness of 
historical failure data before the occurrence of accidents makes it difficult to use traditional risk analysis 
approaches such as probabilistic risk analysis in many cases. This paper aims to develop a new methodology 
capable of assessing regional industrial safety (RIS) in an uncertain environment. A hierarchical structure for 
modelling the risks influencing RIS is first constructed. The hybrid of evidential reasoning (ER) and Analytical 
Hierarchy Process (AHP) is then used to assess the risks in a complementary way, in which AHP is hired to 
evaluate the weight of each risk factor and ER is employed to synthesise the safety evaluations of the investigated 
region(s) against the risk factors from the bottom to the top level in the hierarchy. The successful application of the 
hybrid approach in a real case analysis of RIS in several major districts of Beijing (capital of China) demonstrates 
its feasibility as well as provides risk analysts and safety engineers with useful insights on effective solutions to 
comprehensive risk assessment of RIS in metropolitan cities. The contribution of this paper is made by the findings 
on the comparison of risk levels of RIS at different regions against various risk factors so that best practices from 
the good performer(s) can be used to improve the safety of the others.  
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1. Introduction  
Given the rapid economic and social development, especially the fast growing industrialization and 
automation in a country/region, the occurrence likelihood of industrial accidents declines in general. For 
instance, compared with that in 2009, the number of industrial accidents in Beijing decreased by 8.2% in 2015 
(Beijing Work Safety Statistical Yearbook, 2015). Fig 1 shows the number of death due to industrial accidents 
in China from 2010 to 2015.  Although the number of death is decreasing year by year, the absolute quantities 
are still very large, revealing that the situation of industrial safety is severe as ever, wanting effective solutions 
to be found. Many researchers have made large effort to improve the industrial safety. Chryssolouris (1999) 
explored a virtual reality based approach for the verification of human related factors in assembly and 
maintenance processes [1]. Michalos (2015) made research on design consideration for safe human-robot 
collaborative workplaces [2]. However, ensuring industrial safety in a fast developing economy is 
challenging, given that major and extraordinarily serious accidents (MESA) often present low likelihoods but 
significant consequences. For instance, the explosion accident in Tianjin Port in 2015 caused not only a huge 
loss of properties and lives, but also a significant impact on industrial safety policy making, concerning the 
use of advanced risk analysis approaches to enhance accident prevention in the situations where hazardous 
events have not arisen and historical failure data has not formed any base in critical mass yet. 
  
Fig 1. Number of death due to industrial accidents in China 
Data from: National Economy and Society Developed Statistical Bulletin 2010-2015 from National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic 
of China 
 
Because of the complicated risk factors influencing regional industrial safety (RIS), it is extremely difficult, if 
possible, to get all the relevant data, such as the severity of accident consequences and the occurrence probabilities of 
the accidents. As a result, there are few studies on regional risk assessment in the literature and fewer on use of 
advanced risk modelling to deal with the uncertainty in risk data. When conducting risk analysis of RIS, it is often the 
case that many qualitative and quantitative variables which are of high uncertainty and incompleteness in data, 
influence the risk level of RIS simultaneously. It is therefore necessary to develop a new method capable of tackling 
such challenges.  
This paper aims at developing a new methodology capable of assessing RIS. Following the relevant literature review 
and background analysis in Section 2, a hierarchical structure for modelling the risk factors influencing RIS is first 
constructed in Section 3. The hybrid of evidential reasoning (ER) and Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) is then 
used to assess RIS in a complementary way in which AHP is hired to evaluate the weight of each risk factor and ER is 
employed to synthesise the evaluations of the risk factors from the bottom to the top level in the hierarchy. In Section 
4, the hybrid approach is applied in a real case analysis of RIS across the major districts in Beijing (capital of China) 
to demonstrate its feasibility. Section 5 concludes the work and provides useful insights on effective solutions to 
comprehensive assessment of RIS in metropolitan cities. 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Evidential reasoning approach 
An ER approach was developed in the 1990s to handle uncertainty and randomness, and is amongst the latest Multiple 
Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) techniques. It is based on the Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theory of evidence. The D-S 
theory that was first proposed by Dempster (1967) and developed by Shafer (1976), is regarded as a generalization of 
the Bayesian theory of probability. With the ability of coping with the uncertainty or imprecision embedded in 
evidence, the D-S theory has been widely applied in recent years [3].  
ER is based on an extended decision matrix in which each attribute of an alternative is described by a distributed 
assessment using a belief structure. Bi et al. (2008) [4] explained that the D-S theory is an appropriate and suitable 
approach to dealing with uncertainty and imprecision. It provides a coherent framework to cope with the lack of 
evidence and discards the insufficient reasoning principle. ER enables to translate the relationship between the objects 
and the degree of goodness or badness of their sub-criteria, which are measured by both “the degree to which the sub-
criteria are important to the objects and the degree to which the sub-criteria belong to the good (or bad) category” [5]. 
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 Furthermore, it allows decision-makers’ preference to be aggregated in a structured and rigorous way without 
accepting the linearity assumption [6].  
Due to such advantages, ER has been widely applied to analyse the risks in various sectors when uncertainty in failure 
data is high. The statistics, when using the key words “evidential reasoning” and “risk” to search on web of science, 
shows that in 2010-2017 there are 78 journal papers (e.g. [43-47]), tackling risks in the energy, environmental, 
transport, offshore and logistics industries. A further in-depth analysis of these papers reveals that many of them 
focused on the theoretical modelling work, while the others dealing with ER’s applications in risk tend to analyse 
small scale cases. No studies have been found on the use of ER in RIS and to solve large scale real problems, 
revealing a research gap to be fulfilled, particularly from a practical perspective.  
 
2.2 Analytical Hierarchy Process 
AHP, developed by Saaty (1980), is proved to be a powerful tool for handling both qualitative and quantitative multi-
criteria factors in solving decision-making problems. With this method, a complicated problem can be converted to an 
ordered hierarchical structure. The AHP method has been widely applied to multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) 
situations, including web site selection [7], tools’ evaluation [8], weapon selection [9], and drugs selection [10]. Its 
applications have also been well documented in Vaidya and Kuman, (2006) [11], Subramanain and Ramanathan, 
(2012) [12] in operational management, and Schmidt et al., (2015) [13] in healthcare.   
The first step of AHP is to establish a hierarchical structure of presenting the problem. Then, in each hierarchical 
level, a nominal scale is used to construct a pairwise comparison judgement matrix. The third step is to calculate the 
eigenvector of the matrix. Before the eigenvector is transformed into the weights of elements, the consistency of the 
matrix should be checked through a consistency ratio (CR).  If the result of CR is less than 0.1, the consistency of the 
pairwise comparison matrix M is acceptable. Consequently, the eigenvector of the pairwise comparison judgement 
matrix can be normalized as the final weights of decision elements. Otherwise, the consistency is not ensured and the 
elements in the matrix should be revised. 
 
2.3 The Selection of ER and AHP 
AHP is a systematic technique to evaluate the relative importance between two or more attributes by means of 
pairwise comparisons [14]. It is able to take all of the factors into account within a hierarchic style which enables to 
arrange these factors systematically and to elucidate their contributions to the risks with priority weights [15]. 
Especially, AHP is a powerful tool for handling both qualitative and quantitative multi-criteria factors in decision-
making problems [16]. 
The ER approach models both quantitative and qualitative attributes with uncertainty using a distributed modelling 
framework, in which each attribute is determined by a set of collectively exhaustive assessment grades, called a belief 
structure. The evidence combination rule of the D-S theory makes it possible to gather the influence of each attribute 
in the hierarchy. The ER approach has been widely used in effectively synthesizing pieces of evaluation from various 
criteria in both quantitative and qualitative forms [17] and [48-50]. 
In the risk assessment of RIS, there are many quantitative and qualitative risk factors involving high uncertainties in 
data. Hence, the methodology must have the capability of handling both uncertainty and quantitative and qualitative 
data. AHP is one of the most popular methods of assigning attribute weights with the ability to handle both qualitative 
and quantitative multi-criteria factors, and ER has advantage to dealing with both quantitative and qualitative 
attributes with uncertainty. The integration of AHP and ER approaches has been seen in many MCDM studies such as 
project screening, bridge condition assessment, and risk management. Zhang (2012) applied AHP combined with ER 
in assessing the E-commerce security. It is proved that based on the theory of AHP and ER, the model is flexible and 
practical to cope with qualitative, quantitative and/or uncertain factors [3]. Benjamin and David (2015) [18] made a 
 comparison of the results of a MCDA model through a case of healthcare infrastructure location. It is evidenced that 
the solution by the combination of AHP and ER, provides a transparent and robust framework.  
Although showing much attractiveness, the applications of ER and AHP in dealing with RIS, particularly to solve a 
large scale of real problems need yet to be investigated and validated.  So the method of AHP and ER is chosen to 
apply in evaluating the RIS in this paper. 
3. A new framework for risk assessment of RIS 
A flow chart is first presented in Fig. 2 to visualise a new framework for risk assessment of RIS, and each of the 
detailed steps is described in the ensuing parts ranging from section 3.1 to section 3.5, respectively. 
Identify Risk Variables
Construct Hierarchical Structure
Data Pre-processing
Normalization
Transformation of 
Quantitative Data
Synthesis of the Risk Evaluation of Each Index
Risk Analysis and Ranking of Each Investigated Region
Validation
Collect Original Data
Use AHP to Calculate Weights
Collect Subjective Judgement of Experts
 
 Fig 2. The flow chart of the framework for assessment of RIS (Source: Authors) 
3.1 Identify Risk Variables and Construct the Hierarchical Structure 
The “triangular model of public safety”, proposed by Fan [19], describes public safety by three fundamental attributes, 
emergency, hazard-affected carriers, and emergency management. The hierarchy of evaluating RIS consists of three 
fundamental attributes, disaster-inducing factors, vulnerability of hazard-affected carriers, and safety control. Xie et al. 
(2010) [20] carried out an index system of industrial safety in Beijing, which concerned more on the historical failure 
data and safety supervision data, but less on the hazard-affected carriers. 
Therefore, six experts possessing relevant expertise as well as representing different groups of the stakeholders were 
interviewed at an Expert Seminar on 12th, July, 2016 in Beijing Academy of Safety Science and Technology to go 
over the index system . The background information of the six persons is shown as follows.  
Expert 1: A professor engaged in mining safety evaluation for more than 10 years. 
Expert 2: A senior officer in China Academy of Safety Science and Technology. 
Expert 3: A senior officer in Beijing Research Centre of Urban System Engineering. 
 Expert 4: An expert from China National Institute of Standardization. 
Expert 5: A senior officer in State Administration of Work Safety. 
Expert 6: An expert from Beijing Municipal Institute of Labour Protection. 
The issues such as data availability, situation of industrial safety, the existing index systems were extensively 
discussed with the experts before having their consensus on the development of the factors influencing RIS and the 
hierarchical structure representing their relationship (Table 1). During this data collection process, all the participants 
consented to their participation in this research. The invited experts were all informed about the purpose and content 
of this research and any risks that might be associated with the participation prior to providing consent. We first asked 
for their advices about the index system by a defined questionnaire. At the Expert Seminar, the experts were consulted 
in verbal ways and the results were recorded in a written form (See Table S1). This paper, together with its findings 
was checked by Beijing Academy of Safety Science and Technology.   
 Table 1. Comprehensive Risk Index System of Industrial Safety  
level 1 level 2 level 3 level 4 
disaster-
inducing 
factors  
0.3636 
 accidents  
0.4932 
severity   0.5726 
death toll of industrial safety issues   0.5403 
frequency of industrial safety issues  0.4597 
accountability   0.4274 
number of people investigated and affixed liability  0.5208 
the fines of industrial safety accidents  0.4792 
hidden 
dangers   
0.5068 
number of major hazard sources  0.2664 
number of hidden dangers discovered  0.2290 
number of units with harm of occupational disease  0.2756 
number of people contacted with occupational disease  0.2290 
vulnerability 
of hazard-
affected 
carriers 
0.3182 
vulnerability  
0.5333 
population vulnerability    
0.3371 
the resident population density  0.3875 
proportion of aged population   0.2938 
proportion of children  0.3187 
infrastructural 
vulnerability  0.3429 
number of gas station per km2    1 
economical vulnerability    
0.3200 
the reciprocal of regional GDP per capita  0.4554 
unemployment rate  0.5446 
adaptability   
0.4667 
employee's assurance      
0.4486 
(-)number of employees joined medical assurance   0.5327 
(-)number of employees joined unemployment insurance  
0.4673 
protection     0.5514 
(-)investment of infrastructure   0.3494 
(-)number of medical staff per thousand people  0.3313 
(-)number of hospital beds per thousand people  0.3193 
safety 
control   
0.3182 
supervision   
0.5159  
regulatory capacity       
0.4876 
(-)coverage rate of supervision  0.3558 
(-)economic punishment  0.3252 
(-)punishment rate of supervision  0.3190 
personnel allocation      
0.5124 
(-)crew size of safety supervision system  0.3471 
(-)number of people attending the inspection   0.2882 
(-)*capacity of the safety supervision crew  0.3647 
emergency 
management 
& publicity   
0.4841  
emergency capacity      
0.5120 
(-)number of fire brigade  0.5446 
(-)emergency resources reserves  0.4554 
safety propaganda       
0.4880 
(-)number of news manuscripts about industrial safety  
0.4750 
(-)*the level of public safety awareness  0.5250 
* symbolizes the qualitative indexes 
(-) symbolizes the negative indexes 
Consensus reached at the Expert Seminar on 12th, July, 2016 in Beijing Academy of Safety Science and Technology. 
The numerical values in Table 1 stand for the local weight of each variable. They were calculated by using AHP.  
The three risk parameters in level 1 represent the three fundamental aspects addressing the comprehensive risk of RIS. 
In the aspect of disaster-inducing factors, two main factors must be taken into account. One is historical accidents, and 
the other one is hidden dangers, which reflect the potential failures. As far as the details of accidents are concerned, 
severity and accountability are taken into consideration in order to reflect their relevant risk levels accordingly. 
The vulnerability of hazard-affected carriers is determined by two factors, vulnerability (used to describe the easiness 
of an asset/a system to be destroyed) and adaptability (used to describe the difficulty of an asset/a system to be 
destroyed and ability that the asset/system recovers after disturbances). Vulnerability consists of population 
vulnerability, infrastructural vulnerability, and economical vulnerability while adaptability is associated with 
assurance and protection taken by the stakeholders. For instance, population vulnerability will be high if there is a 
large population density, high proportion of aged population and children. Adaptability will be reflected by the plan on 
evacuation and rescue work. 
 To address safety control, supervision and emergency management and publicity are taken into account. Regulatory 
capacity and personnel allocation are two main indexes to measure the supervision work. Similarly, emergency 
capacity and safety propaganda are used to represent the index of emergency management and publicity.    
 
3.2 Data Pre-processing 
The basic input data of the indexes in level 4 are collected through a field investigation from each district in Beijing 
and by mining secondary data from Beijing Work Safety Statistical Yearbook, Beijing Statistical Information Net, 
websites of Beijing Subway and Beijing Municipal Commission of City Management.     
3.2.1 Normalization 
Data normalization is threefold in this study. Firstly, max-min normalization is chosen to normalize the quantitative 
data. The initial max-min normalization process is performed using the following equation [21]: 
𝑡𝑐 =
𝑥𝑐 − 𝑥min
𝑥max − 𝑥min
                  (1) 
where 𝑥𝑐 represents the initial datum of district c, 𝑥max and 𝑥min represent the maximum and minimum values of the 
initial data associated with the same index respectively.  
Secondly, the data of all the negative indexes are processed using the following equation to ensure they have the same 
impact on the risk contribution to the top level index.   
𝑟𝑐 = 1 − 𝑡𝑐                 (2) 
The data collected by the field investigation is shown in S1 Table. 
Thirdly, linguistics terms with a belief structure are employed to evaluate the qualitative indexes (i.e. capacity of the 
safety supervision crew and the level of public safety awareness).  The 10 experts in Beijing Academy of Safety 
Science and Technology are interviewed to conduct the evaluation of 16 districts in Beijing based on their valuable 
experience which comes from their working on the frontline in the field of industrial safety using the following 
formula.  
𝐹𝐵𝑆 = {(𝐹𝐻𝑛, 𝛽𝑛)}     (3) 
where 𝐹𝐻𝑛 represents the nth assessment grade; 𝛽𝑛 represents the corresponding degree of belief. For instance, the 
five assessment grades used to define the index of “capacity of the safety supervision crew” are “Very High, High, 
Average, Low, Very Low”. Consequently, the S2 Table shows all the normalized data used in this research. 
 3.2.2 Transformation of Quantitative Data 
The normalized data of the indexes in level 4 needs to be transformed and expressed by the same utility used to 
describe the qualitative data in order to synthesise them for safety evaluation of the index in the top level.  Fuzzy 
membership functions are therefore used to realise such transformation [22].  
The uniformed set of qualitative grades of “Very low”, “Low”, “Average”, “High” and “Very high” and their fuzzy 
membership functions are defined and verified by the experts, and shown in Fig 3 [23]. It is noted here that all the 
quantitative data has been normalised to be associated with a crisp value in [0, 1].   
 
Fig 3. Membership function of the qualitative grades used to transform the quantitative data 
After the definition of fuzzy membership functions in Fig 3, a risk index value of a particular district can be 
transformed and expressed by the defined qualitative grades with a belief structure. Suppose the risk value is 
associated with two neighbouring grades 𝐹𝐻𝑛 and 𝐹𝐻𝑛+1, and their fuzzy memberships  𝜇𝐹𝐻𝑛  and 𝜇𝐹𝐻𝑛+1 indicate the 
degree to which the risk value belongs to the grade of 𝐹𝐻𝑛 and 𝐹𝐻𝑛+1, respectively (see Fig 4). The normalised fuzzy 
belief structure (FBS),  𝐹𝐵𝑆 = {(𝐹𝐻𝑛, 𝛽𝑛)}, can be calculated by using Eqs. (4-5) [24]. Consequently, all quantitative 
data is transformed into their qualitative counterparties, as shown in the S3 Table.    
 𝛽𝑛 =
𝜇𝐹𝐻𝑛
𝜇𝐹𝐻𝑛 + 𝜇𝐹𝐻𝑛+1
                         (4) 
𝛽𝑛+1 =
𝜇𝐹𝐻𝑛+1
𝜇𝐹𝐻𝑛 + 𝜇𝐹𝐻𝑛+1
                       (5) 
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Fig 4. Fuzzy belief structure transforming process 
* 𝑟𝑖 represents the normalized value of quantitative index, and u(r) stands for the fuzzy membership, indicating the degree to which the risk value 
belongs to the relevant grade 
 
3.3 Use AHP to Calculate the Weights of each variable 
The numerical values in Table 1 stand for the weight of each variable that is calculated by AHP. For instance, the 
weights of “number of major hazard sources”, “number of hidden dangers discovered”, “number of units with harm of 
occupational disease”, and “number of people contacted with occupational disease” are calculated as follow.  
A questionnaire (S4 and S5) was used to collect the subjective judgements of 12 experts in Beijing Academy of Safety 
Science and Technology. Initially 12 experts were approached because of their rich experience in the field of 
industrial safety management. Data from 2 experts, presenting the same evaluation of the qualitative index for all 16 
districts being investigated, was found irrational and hence eliminated. All the questionnaire data of the rest 10 experts 
are showed in S6.The grades defined in Table 2 were used by individual experts in their initial judgments in terms of 
the importance of the indexes. Then the average values of all the initial judgments with respect to a pair of indexes are 
applied into the pairwise comparison process of AHP.   
Table 2. The standard of grading 
Importance Grade 
Unimportant 1 
Slightly important 3 
Fairly important 5 
Obviously important 7 
Absolutely important 9 
Among them 2、4、6、8 
 
The AHP matrix of the investigated four indexes is shown in Table 3. 
𝒓𝒊 
𝝁𝑭𝑯𝒏+𝟏  
𝝁𝑭𝑯𝒏 
𝑭𝑯𝒏 𝑭𝑯𝒏+𝟏 
 Table 3. Judgement Matrix 
variables 
number of 
major 
hazard 
sources   
number of 
hidden 
dangers 
discovered   
number of units 
with harm of 
occupational 
disease 
number of people 
contacted with 
occupational 
disease 
number of major hazard sources  (8) 1 1.1633 0.9661 1.1633 
number of hidden dangers discovered  (5) 0.8596 1 0.8305 1 
number of units with harm of occupational 
disease (3)  
1.0351 1.2041 1 1.2041 
number of people contacted with 
occupational disease (3) 
0.8596 1 0.8305 1 
 
Based on the standard AHP calculations, the weights of the four indexes are obtained as 0.2664 for “number of major 
hazard sources”, 0.2290 for “number of hidden dangers discovered”, 0.2756 for “number of units with harm of 
occupational disease”, and 0.2290 for “number of people contacted with occupational disease”, respectively.  
In a similar way, the weights of other indexes in Table 1 are obtained.  
 
3.4 Synthesis of the Risk Evaluation of Each Index  
ER can be used to synthesise the transformed risk evaluations in the S3 table from the bottom (i.e. level 4) to the top 
level (i.e. level 1) in Table 1.  Suppose every index Sj in an upper level consists of multiple (L) indexes in a lower 
level. Through the steps in Section 3.2.2, the fuzzy belief structure, 𝐹𝐵𝑆𝑖 = {(𝐹𝐻𝑛, 𝛽𝑛,𝑖)}, of every index in the lower 
level is acquired and expressed in S3 Table. The relevant weight of every index, 𝜔𝑖, is calculated by the method of 
AHP and shown in Table 1. The probability masses associated with each grade of an index in the lower level can be 
calculated using the following equations [25]: 
𝑚𝑛,𝑖 = 𝜔𝑖𝛽𝑛,𝑖                  (6) 
𝑚𝐻,𝑖 = 1 −∑𝑚𝑛,𝑖
𝑁
𝑛=1
                   (7) 
?̅?𝐻,𝑖 = 1 − 𝜔𝑖                    (8) 
?̃?𝐻,𝑖 = 𝜔𝑖 (1 −∑𝛽𝑛,𝑖
𝑁
𝑛=1
)             (9) 
where 𝑛 = 1,2, … ,𝑁, representing the number of the linguistic terms, which equals to 5 in this paper; 𝑖 = 1,2,… , 𝐿, 
representing the number of indexes in a lower level; 𝑚𝑛,𝑖 represents the basic belief degree to which the risk index 𝑅𝑖 
belongs to the grade of 𝐹𝐻𝑛; 𝑚𝐻,𝑖 is the unassigned probability mass caused by the lack of information, which is split 
into two parts, 𝑚𝐻,𝑖 = ?̅?𝐻,𝑖 + ?̃?𝐻,𝑖; N represents the number of assessment grades (i.e. 5 in this study); and L stands 
for the number of indexes under the same upper index.  
Next, it is to aggregate the output from 𝑅𝑖  (𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝐿) to generate the combined degree of belief of each index Sj at 
the upper level. The FBS of the index Sj at the upper level, 𝐹𝐵𝑆𝑆 = {(𝐹𝐻𝑛, 𝛽𝑛
𝑆)}, can be calculated using the following 
equations :    
{𝐻𝑛}: 𝑚𝑛,𝐼(𝑖+1) = 𝐾𝐼(𝑖+1)[𝑚𝑛,𝐼(𝑖)𝑚𝑛,𝑖+1 +𝑚𝐻,𝐼(𝑖)𝑚𝑛,𝑖+1 +𝑚𝑛,𝐼(𝑖)𝑚𝐻,𝑖+1],     
𝑛 = 1,2,… ,𝑁         (10) 
𝑚𝐻,𝐼(𝑖) = ?̅?𝐻,𝐼(𝑖) + ?̃?𝐻,𝐼(𝑖)            (11) 
{𝐻}:   ?̃?𝐻,𝐼(𝑖+1) = 𝐾𝐼(𝑖+1)[?̃?𝐻,𝐼(𝑖)?̃?𝐻,𝑖+1 + ?̅?𝐻,𝐼(𝑖)?̃?𝐻,𝑖+1 + ?̃?𝐻,𝐼(𝑖)?̅?𝐻,𝑖+1]            (12) 
{𝐻}:   ?̅?𝐻,𝐼(𝑖+1) = 𝐾𝐼(𝑖+1)[?̅?𝐻,𝐼(𝑖)?̅?𝐻,𝑖+1]              
 𝐾𝐼(𝑖+1) =
{
 
 
 
 
1 −∑∑𝑚𝑡,𝐼(𝑖)𝑚𝑗,𝑖+1
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑗≠𝑡
𝑁
𝑡=1
}
 
 
 
 
−1
              𝑖 = {1,2,… , 𝐿 − 1}       (13) 
𝛽𝑛
𝑆 =
𝑚𝑛,𝐼(𝐿)
1 − ?̅?𝐻,𝐼(𝐿)
,        𝑛 = 1,2,… ,𝑁               (14) 
𝛽𝐻
𝑆 =
?̃?𝐻,𝐼(𝐿)
1 − ?̅?𝐻,𝐼(𝐿)
               (15) 
where 𝑚𝑛,𝐼(𝑖) (𝑛 = 1,2,… ,𝑁), ?̃?𝐻,𝐼(𝑖) and ?̅?𝐻,𝐼(𝑖) denote the combined probability masses generated by aggregating 
the first i indexes.  
Through equations (10) - (15), the belief structure of the index Sj is obtained. 𝛽𝑛
𝑆  means the likelihood to which 𝐻𝑛 is 
assessed. 𝛽𝐻
𝑆  is the unassigned degree of belief representing the extent of incompleteness in the overall assessments. 
Similarly, the generated assessment for Sj can be represented by the following distribution: 
𝑆𝑗 = {(𝐻𝑛, 𝛽𝑛
𝑆), {𝑛 = 1,2,… ,𝑁} 
where Sj is assessed to the grade 𝐻𝑛 with the degree of belief of 𝛽𝑛
𝑆 (𝑛 = 1,2,… ,𝑁). 
Such a process continues from the bottom to the top level along the hierarchy (in Table 1) until the FBS of the index at 
the top level is acquired.  
3.5 Risk Analysis and Ranking of Each Investigated Region 
Through the steps in Section 3.4, the FBS of each index at all the four levels (in Table 1) can be calculated and 
expressed by the defined grades with a belief structure. To prioritise the investigated regions in terms of their risks, 
utility values 𝑢(𝐻𝑛), are assigned in a linear form (i.e. 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1) to the five defined grades [26], 
respectively. Consequently, the crisp risk score of each investigated region can be computed using Eq (16).  
𝑢(𝐸) = ∑𝛽𝑛𝑢(𝐻𝑛)
𝑁
𝑛=1
                  (16) 
where N denotes the number of the linguistic terms; and N equals to 5 in this paper. 
3.6 Validation 
A sensitivity analysis is conducted to test the proposed risk assessment framework of RIS. Sensitivity analysis refers 
to analysing how sensitive the conclusions are to minor changes in inputs [26]. If the methodology is sound, the 
sensitivity analysis must, at least, follow the following three axioms. 
Axiom 1. A slight increment/ decrement in the degrees of belief associated with any linguistic variables of the lowest-
level factors will certainly result in the effect of a relative increment/decrement in the result of industrial safety risk 
assessment of each district. 
Axiom 2. Given the same variation of belief degree distributions of the lowest-level factors, its influence magnitude to 
the result of industrial safety risk assessment of each district will keep consistency with their weight distributions. 
Axiom 3. The total influence magnitude of x factors (evidence) in the lowest level on the result of industrial safety risk 
assessment of each district will be always greater than the one from the set of x-y (𝑦 ∈ 𝑥) factors (subevidence).  
 To validate the methodology, a new method of sensitivity analysis [27] is applied in this case study. First, a belief 
degree of 0.1 belonging to the grade(s) of the highest risk contributions (e.g. “Very high” and “High”) is reassigned 
and moved toward the maximal decrement of risk of industrial safety at a step of 0.01 to obtain the Low Risk 
Inference (LRI), which is calculated using the following equation: 
𝐿𝑅𝐼 = 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 − 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒          (17) 
Next, similarly, a belief degree of 0.1 belonging to the grade(s) of the lowest risk contributions (e.g. “Very low” and 
“Low”) is reassigned and moved toward the maximal increment of risk of industrial safety at a step of 0.01 to obtain 
the High Risk Inference (HRI), which is calculated using the following equation: 
𝐻𝑅𝐼 = 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 − 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙         (18) 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 stands for the initial industrial safety risk based on the initial FBSs; 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 stands for the 
industrial safety risk after the change of  FBSs in equations (17) and (18). 
Lastly, the average value will show the True Risk Influence (TRI) of each index, which can be calculated as follows: 
𝑇𝑅𝐼 =
𝐿𝑅𝐼 + 𝐻𝑅𝐼
2
     (19) 
 
4. Comprehensive risk assessment of RIS in Beijing  
4.1 Study Areas 
Due to its rapid industrialization, Beijing, 39°26′N− 41°03′N, 115°25′E − 117°30′E, the capital of China, is facing 
lots of challenges on ensuing its industrial safety. The occurrence of any major industrial safety accident could cause 
huge loss in terms of both human lives and financial costs. In this real case study, the 16 districts in Beijing are 
investigated to assess the comprehensive risks in order to improve their RIS. Through a comparative study of different 
districts, the vulnerability of each district in terms of the industrial safety related work are identified to aid the 
governments on risk based safety decisions.  
4.2 Application of the New Methodology to the Case 
From Table 1, it is known that hidden dangers are influenced by four indexes of “number of major hazard sources”, 
“number of hidden dangers discovered”, “number of units with harm of occupational disease”, and “number of people 
contacted with occupational disease”. Given the weights of the four indexes (in Table 1) and the risk evaluation of 
each district with respect to the four indexes (in S3 Table), the ER algorithm (i.e. Eqs 10-15) are used to calculated the 
risk score of each district in terms of hidden dangers. Using the ER associated computing software IDS [26] , the risk 
score of each district in terms of their hidden dangers, is shown as Fig 5. 
 
  
Fig 5. Assessment result of hidden dangers of each district 
4.3 The Result of Assessment 
Similar to the analysis in Section 4.2, the final risk score of each investigated district is calculated by using the IDS 
software to produce the results graphically [28]. It is seen in Fig 6.    
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
Fig 6. Result (FBS) of industrial safety comprehensive risk assessment of each district 
 
Consequently, the result of district A is  
{(𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐿𝑜𝑤, 53.21%), (𝐿𝑜𝑤, 8.40%), (𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒, 8.74%), (𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ, 14.55%), (𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ, 15.10%)}. 
It means that the risk of industrial safety in district A is 53.21% “Very Low”, 8.40% “Low”, 8.74% “Average” , 
14.55% “High” , and 15.10% “Very High”. Given that 61.61% belongs to “Very low” and “Low”, district A’s 
industrial safety situation is relatively good.  
Next Eq. 16 is used to calculate the risk score of each district with respect to different indexes. The assessment result 
of each district with respect to an index at any level of the hierarchy can be calculated and is showed in Fig 7. 
 
  
 
 
Fig 7. The result of each part of the hierarchy 
From Fig 7, the strengths and weaknesses of each district can be clearly observed.  For example, for district A, the 
figures above show that its vulnerability and supervision are of high risk. In other words, its vulnerability is high and 
its supervision related work has not been undertaken well. It is wise and necessary for the government of district A to 
put more effort and resources to improve it. 
Finally, the total comprehensive risk score of each district by taking into account all the indexes is obtained and shown 
in Fig 8.  
 
  
Fig 8. The final assessment result of risk score for each district 
From Fig 8, it is clear that the comprehensive risk of district G in terms of industrial safety is the highest, while the 
one in district B is the lowest.  
The results in Fig 8 provide useful insights on which district possesses the highest level of industrial safety and which 
aspects of security work should be enhanced. All of these results possess an important value to both governments and 
the related enterprises. 
 
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
To validate the methodology, a sensitivity analysis is carried out. Because of the number of the variables, it is 
impracticable to apply sensitivity analysis to all variables. According to the highest weight distribution, a branch of the 
hierarchy is chosen to be a representation, as showed in Table 4. 
Table 4. A branch chosen to conduct the sensitivity analysis 
number of major hazard sources   
number of hidden dangers discovered   
number of units with harm of occupational disease   
number of people contacted with occupational disease  
 
After the input data transformation, the risk evaluations are expressed by FBSs such as (1, 0, 0, 0, 0), and (0, 0, 0, 0, 
1), using the method which is mentioned in section 3.6, the results of the sensitivity analysis are shown as followed. 
First, because the FBSs of these four indexes of district A are all (1, 0, 0, 0, 0), a change of belief degree from 0 to 0.1 
with a step of 0.01 is used for each variable toward the maximal increment of risk of industrial safety. Then, the risks 
are calculated and showed in Fig 9. 
 
 
  
Fig 9. Sensitivity analysis of a branch of hierarchy of district A 
Note: 1 stands for number of major hazard sources; 2 stands for number of hidden dangers discovered; 3 stands for number of units with 
harm of occupational disease; and 4 stands for number of people contacted with occupational disease. 
Then, districts A to D are taken as examples to calculate the true risk inference (TRI). 
Table 5. High Risk Inference (HRI) 
Row I II III IV 
HRI OF RISK OF DISTRICT 
A B C D 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 1 0 0 0 0.0025 0.0042 0.0073 0.0049 
3 0 1 0 0 0.0021 0.0021 0 0.0043 
4 0 0 1 0 0.0027 0.0045 0.0026 0.0022 
5 0 0 0 1 0.0021 0.0034 0.0068 0.0016 
6 1 1 0 0 0.0048 0.0065 0.0073 0.0093 
7 1 0 1 0 0.0055 0.009 0.0098 0.0073 
8 1 0 0 1 0.0048 0.0079 0.0138 0.0067 
9 0 1 1 0 0.0049 0.0068 0.0026 0.0066 
10 0 1 0 1 0.0043 0.0057 0.0068 0.006 
11 0 0 1 1 0.0049 0.0082 0.0094 0.0039 
12 1 1 1 0 0.0079 0.0115 0.0098 0.0118 
13 1 1 0 1 0.0072 0.0103 0.0138 0.0112 
14 1 0 1 1 0.0079 0.013 0.0163 0.0092 
15 0 1 1 1 0.0074 0.0107 0.0094 0.0085 
 16 1 1 1 1 0.0106 0.0156 0.0163 0.0139 
 
Note: "1" means that a 0.1 degree of belief is reassigned and move toward the maximal increment of risk of industrial safety of each district. 
 
 
Table 6. Low Risk Inference (LRI) 
Row I II III IV 
LRI OF RISK OF DISTRICT 
A B C D 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 0 1 0 0 0 0.0019 0.0063 0.0012 
4 0 0 1 0 0 0.0017 0.0081 0.0037 
5 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.0021 0.0032 
6 1 1 0 0 0 0.0019 0.0063 0.0012 
7 1 0 1 0 0 0.0017 0.0081 0.0037 
8 1 0 0 1 0 0 0.0021 0.0032 
9 0 1 1 0 0 0.0035 0.0145 0.0049 
10 0 1 0 1 0 0.0019 0.0085 0.0044 
11 0 0 1 1 0 0.0017 0.0103 0.0069 
12 1 1 1 0 0 0.0035 0.0145 0.0049 
13 1 1 0 1 0 0.0019 0.0085 0.0044 
14 1 0 1 1 0 0.0017 0.0103 0.0069 
15 0 1 1 1 0 0.0035 0.0167 0.0081 
16 1 1 1 1 0 0.0035 0.0167 0.0081 
 
Note: "1" means that a 0.1 degree of belief is reassigned and move toward the maximal decrement of risk of industrial safety of each 
district. 
Table 7. True Risk Inference (TRI) 
Row I II III IV 
TRI OF RISK OF DISTRICT 
A B C D 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 1 0 0 0 0.00125 0.0021 0.00365 0.00245 
3 0 1 0 0 0.00105 0.002 0.00315 0.00275 
4 0 0 1 0 0.00135 0.0031 0.00535 0.00295 
5 0 0 0 1 0.00105 0.0017 0.00445 0.0024 
6 1 1 0 0 0.0024 0.0042 0.0068 0.00525 
7 1 0 1 0 0.00275 0.00535 0.00895 0.0055 
8 1 0 0 1 0.0024 0.00395 0.00795 0.00495 
9 0 1 1 0 0.00245 0.00515 0.00855 0.00575 
10 0 1 0 1 0.00215 0.0038 0.00765 0.0052 
11 0 0 1 1 0.00245 0.0029 0.00685 0.0034 
12 1 1 1 0 0.00395 0.0075 0.01215 0.00835 
13 1 1 0 1 0.0036 0.0061 0.01115 0.0078 
14 1 0 1 1 0.00395 0.00735 0.0133 0.00805 
15 0 1 1 1 0.0037 0.0071 0.01305 0.0083 
16 1 1 1 1 0.0053 0.00955 0.0165 0.011 
 
 Note: I stands for number of major hazard sources; II stands for number of hidden dangers discovered; III stands for number of units with 
harm of occupational disease; and IV stands for number of people contacted with occupational disease. 
 
First, all the results obviously keep harmony with Axiom 1 in section 3.4. That is to say, the industrial safety of each 
district is sensitive to the variation of the lowest-level factors. Fig 9 shows the influence magnitude based on the 
weight distribution. A change of belief degree from 0 to 0.1 with a step of 0.01 is used for each variable toward the 
maximal increment of risk of industrial safety. The result reveals that it is consistent with Axiom 2 in section 3.4. 
Then the results in Table 5-7 show that the total influence magnitude of x factors in the lowest level on the result of 
risk assessment of each district will be always greater than the one from the set of x-y (𝑦 ∈ 𝑥) factors, which means 
that it keeps consistent with Axiom 3 in section 3.4. It can be easily examined by comparing the risk of districts in the 
chosen row in Table 7. For instance, Row 12 is chosen as the evidence, and Rows 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9 are identified as the 
sub-evidence. Comparing all the industrial safety risks of district A (i.e., the TRI of district A in Row 12 is 0.00395, 
which is larger than that in Rows 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 9), it indicates that the model is validated through the investigation 
of Row 12. Similarly, a comparison of all the results in Table 7 has also been examined.  
5. Conclusion 
This paper proposes a new RIS assessment method using the hybrid of ER and AHP. A hierarchical structure of 
indexes to evaluate the comprehensive risk of RIS is constructed, which can be used as the reference to guide the 
development of RIS assessment models for other metropolitan cities. Compared to the real data from Beijing Work 
Safety Statistical Yearbook, the evaluation results of this model reflect the reality to a very high extent. For instance, 
in terms of the accidents, district C is of the highest risk value, and district A, L, N possess low risk values, which is in 
line with the reality reflected by historical data. However, the model can take into account both qualitative and 
quantitative data, which is more all-sided, and deal with the associated uncertainty to realise comprehensive RIS 
assessment against different variables and thus, aid to know the overall safety performance of different districts, which 
would not be achieved from the statistical analysis alone.   
 
The contribution of this paper is made by the findings on the comparison of RIS risk levels of different regions against 
various risk factors so that best practices from the good performer(s) can be used to improve the safety of the others. 
The evaluation results can provide suggestive, useful and scientific support for the governments to rationally allocate 
the industrial safety resources to make metropolitan cities safer.  
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87 
844
0 
8302 
739
4 
7638 508 1463 964 1406 1454 209 180 444 214 158 
Beijing Statistical 
Information Net 
http://w
ww.bjst
ats.gov.
cn/ 
proportion of 
aged 
population 
0.12
87 
0.14
12 
0.09
11 
0.07
41 
0.09
73 
0.10
25 
0.10
1 
0.08
6 
0.07
73 
0.07
46 
0.07
03 
0.12
21 
0.09
69 
0.11
14 
0.10
5 
0.10
44 
Beijing Statistical 
Information Net 
http://w
ww.bjst
ats.gov.
cn/ 
proportion of 
children 
0.08
03 
0.08
67 
0.09
35 
0.08
86 
0.09
73 
0.08
85 
0.10
99 
0.09
2 
0.09
56 
0.09
53 
0.10
09 
0.10
23 
0.11
26 
0.10
19 
0.10
71 
0.11
08 
Beijing Statistical 
Information Net 
http://w
ww.bjst
ats.gov.
cn/ 
infr
astr
number of gas 
station per km2 
0.28
7 
0.33
6 
0.29
7 
0.18
1 
0.29
4 
0.19
0 
0.07
0 
0.10
4 
0.08
5 
0.05
6 
0.09
6 
0.01
0 
0.01
2 
0.03
8 
0.01
7 
0.01
9 
Beijing 
Municipal 
www.bj
mac.go
 car
rier
s 
uct
ural 
vul
ner
abil
ity 
Commission of 
City 
Management 
v.cn/csy
xbz/ 
eco
no
mic
al 
vul
ner
abil
ity 
the reciprocal 
of regional 
GDP per 
capita 
5.79
E-06 
4.61
E-
06 
9.69
E-
06 
9.32
E-06 
2.24
E-
05 
1.76
E-05 
2.10
E-05 
2.65
E-05 
7.98
E-06 
3.39
E-05 
3.49
E-05 
2.44
E-05 
1.91
E-05 
2.50
E-05 
2.44
E-05 
3.43
E-05 
Beijing Statistical 
Information Net 
http://w
ww.bjst
ats.gov.
cn/ 
unemployment 
rate 
0.00
5 
0.00
4 
0.00
2 
0.00
2 
0.00
4 
0.00
6 
0.00
6 
0.00
3 
0.00
3 
0.00
2 
0.00
2 
0.01
3 
0.00
6 
0.00
5 
0.00
4 
0.00
7 
Beijing Statistical 
Information Net 
http://w
ww.bjst
ats.gov.
cn/ 
ada
pta
bili
ty 
em
plo
yee'
s 
ass
ura
nce 
(-)number of 
employees 
joined medical 
assurance 
1190
326 
157
717
7 
229
487
1 
2115
309 
659
095 
2815
88 
2623
32 
4219
55 
4692
64 
3447
09 
4030
52 
1429
18 
1691
17 
1498
00 
1582
06 
1052
22 
Beijing Statistical 
Information Net 
http://w
ww.bjst
ats.gov.
cn/ 
(-)number of 
employees 
joined 
unemployment 
insurance 
1025
641 
140
444
0 
218
963
9 
2000
938 
575
847 
2442
28 
2461
87 
3072
71 
4215
80 
3167
07 
3468
94 
1380
66 
1581
13 
1297
56 
1355
67 
6116
8 
Beijing Statistical 
Information Net 
http://w
ww.bjst
ats.gov.
cn/ 
prot
ecti
on 
(-)investment 
of 
infrastructure 
87.8
1 
50.9
7 
371.
98 
155.
29 
197.
63 
62.4
5 
146.
62 
134.
64 
94.0
3 
113.
75 
93.2
2 
63.3
5 
42.2
8 
29.7
1 
77.2
8 
37.4
6 
Beijing Statistical 
Information Net 
http://w
ww.bjst
ats.gov.
cn/ 
(-)number of 
medical staff 
per thousand 
people 
20.4
1 
18.8
2 
8.72 6.17 5.68 8.64 6.37 4.23 4.96 4.18 4.7 8.29 6.27 6.68 5.61 5.34 
Beijing Statistical 
Information Net 
http://w
ww.bjst
ats.gov.
cn/ 
(-)number of 
hospital beds 
per thousand 
people 
11.8
7 
11.1
3 
4.6 2.68 3.83 5.47 5.14 1.83 2.52 4.75 3.57 7.92 3.58 4.11 2.37 2.39 
Beijing Statistical 
Information Net 
http://w
ww.bjst
ats.gov.
cn/ 
saf
ety 
con
trol 
sup
erv
isio
n 
reg
ulat
ory 
cap
acit
y 
(-)coverage 
rate of 
supervision 
0.06
61 
0.13
7 
0.67
54 
0.12
4 
0.08
22 
0.15
57 
0.26
15 
0.20
94 
0.32
67 
0.26
01 
0.68
49 
0.37
47 
0.34
51 
0.29
35 
0.27
01 
0.11
99 
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(-)economic 
punishment 
40.1
4 
124.
5 
951.
15 
362.
89 
192.
7 
53.3 164 
422.
5 
278.
35 
76.6
2 
385.
85 
162.
22 
56.3 47.7 40 
96.6
9 
Beijing work 
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yearbook 2013 
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(-)punishment 
rate of 
supervision 
0.03
77 
0.07
29 
0.03
32 
0.04
22 
0.04
78 
0.03
51 
0.05
08 
0.08
31 
0.13
23 
0.03
52 
0.02
77 
0.03
61 
0.04
46 
0.03
13 
0.02
78 
0.04 
Beijing work 
safety statistical 
yearbook 2013 
Page 47 
 pers
onn
el 
allo
cati
on 
(-)crew size of 
safety 
supervision 
system 
52 67 66 54 57 33 77 55 49 83 75 46 43 37 45 43 
Beijing work 
safety statistical 
yearbook 2013 
Page 67 
(-)number of 
people 
attending the 
inspection 
1264
9 
453
35 
588
22 
1442
2 
434
94 
2137
8 
1868
4 
6144 
1121
4 
3346
6 
4657
1 
1252
9 
1500
0 
8212 
1445
6 
1129
1 
Beijing work 
safety statistical 
yearbook 2013 
Page 40 
(-)*capacity of 
the safety 
supervision 
crew 
(0,0,
0.1,0
.4,0.
5) 
(0,0,
0.1,
0.6,
0.3) 
(0,0,
0.2,
0.4,
0.4) 
(0,0.
1,0.1
,0.5,
0.3) 
(0,0,
0.2,
0.6,
0.2) 
(0,0.
1,0.3
,0.5,
0.1) 
(0,0,
0.3,0
.6,0.
1) 
(0,0.
1,0.1
,0.4,
0.4) 
(0,0.
2,0.6
,0.2
） 
(0,0.
1,0.3
,0.4,
0.2) 
(0,0.
1,0.3
,0.4,
0.2) 
(0,0.
1,0.3
,0.5,
0.1) 
(0,0.
1,0.2
,0.5,
0.2) 
(0,0.
1,0.3
,0.5,
0.1) 
(0,0.
1,0.2
,0.6,
0.1) 
(0,0.
1,0.3
,0.5,
0.1) 
statistical data 
from 
questionnaire 
  
em
erg
enc
y 
ma
nag
em
ent 
& 
pub
lici
ty 
eme
rge
ncy 
cap
acit
y 
(-)number of 
fire brigade 
9 9 21 16 12 5 4 6 9 8 11 3 5 4 3 6 
statistical data 
from website 
  
(-)emergency 
resources 
reserves 
44.7
14 
51.0
52 
50.8
7 
41.8
18 
45.0
78 
33.1
3 
33.4
94 
42.1
82 
44.7
14 
32.4
02 
54.4
94 
26.9
74 
32.5
84 
26.9
74 
29.6
88 
14.6
62 
statistical data 
from Beijing 
Administration of 
Work Safety 
  
safe
ty 
pro
pag
and
a 
(-)number of 
news 
manuscripts 
about 
industrial 
safety 
170 429 829 788 634 170 69 245 645 1066 95 465 677 934 895 275 
Beijing work 
safety statistical 
yearbook 2013 
Page 66 
(-)*the level of 
public safety 
awareness 
(0,0.
1,0.1
,0.4,
0.4) 
(0,0,
0.2,
0.4,
0.4) 
(0,0,
0.2,
0.6,
0.2) 
(0,0,
0.2,0
.5,0.
3) 
(0.1,
0,0.
4,0.
5,0) 
(0,0.
1,0.2
,0.6,
0.1) 
(0,0.
1,0.3
,0.5,
0.1) 
(0,0.
1,0.2
,0.6,
0.1) 
(0,0.
1,0.4
,0,4,
0.1) 
(0.1,
0,0.4
,0.5,
0) 
(0.1,
0.1,0
.4,0.
4,0) 
(0.1,
0,0.5
,0.4,
0) 
(0.1,
0,0.5
,0.4,
0) 
(0.1,
0,0.5
,0.4,
0) 
(0.1,
0,0.5
,0.4,
0) 
(0.1,
0,0.4
,0.5,
0) 
statistical data 
from 
questionnaire 
  
* A-P in the table S1 , table S2, table S3 and other places in this paper stand for the 16 districts including Dongcheng, Xicheng, Shijingshan, Chaoyang, Fengtai, Fangshan, Haidian, Tongzhou, 
Shunyi, Daxing, Changping, Mentougou, Pinggu, Huairou, Miyun, and Yanqing, but not respectively.
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S2 Table. Normalized Data 
level 
1 
level 
2 
level 
3 
level 4 A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P 
disast
er-
induc
ing 
factor
s   
 
accid
ents   
severi
ty    
death toll of industrial 
safety issues    
0.0171 0.0171 1 0.4343 0.3086 0.0229 0.56 0.4457 0.5657 0.5657 0.2057 0 0.1029 0.08 0.1371 0.0857 
frequency of industrial 
safety issues   
0 0.0321 1 0.4615 0.3269 0.0256 0.5962 0.4359 0.5705 0.5641 0.1987 0.0128 0.1282 0.0769 0.1603 0.1090 
accou
ntabili
ty    
number of people 
investigated and 
affixed liability   
0 0 0.1818 1 0.2273 0.0455 0 0 0 0.0455 0.1364 0.0455 0.1364 0 0.0455 0 
the fines  of ISA  0.1128 0.2127 1 0.3046 0.4830 0.2057 0.0849 0.2772 0.3227 0.0802 0 0.0236 0.0328 0.0021 0.0309 0.5395 
hidde
n 
dange
rs    
number of major hazard sources   0 0 0 0.0408 0.0306 0.1224 0.0306 1 0.1327 0.1633 0.1020 0.0918 0 0 0 
0.0102
2 
number of hidden dangers 
discovered   
0.0474 0.0474 0.3214 1 0.1331 0.3104 0.1378 0.0270 0.0636 0.0653 0.2732 0.2451 0 0.0834 0.0553 0.1065 
number of units with harm of 
occupational disease  
0 0 0.1312 0.8884 0.4661 0.3741 0.1176 0.9789 1 0.9894 0.4646 0.8778 0.1222 0.4887 0.3937 0.5641 
number of people contacted with 
occupational disease   
0.0196 0.0196 0.0978 0.1712 0.6174 0.3652 0.1568 0.4903 0.7873 1 0.0496 0.4081 0 0.2818 0.2840 0.1854 
vulne
rabilit
y of 
hazar
d-
affect
ed 
carrie
rs  
vulne
rabilit
y   
popul
ation 
vulner
ability     
the resident population 
density   
0.8411 1 0.3231 0.3178 0.2823 0.2919 0.0137 0.0509 0.0314 0.0487 0.0506 0.0020 0.0009 0.0112 0.0022 0 
proportion of aged 
population    
0.8237 1 0.2934 0.0536 0.3808 0.4542 0.4330 0.2214 0.0987 0.0606 0 0.7306 0.3752 0.5797 0.4894 0.4810 
proportion of children 0 0.1981 0.4087 0.2570 0.5263 0.2539 0.9164 0.3622 0.4737 0.4644 0.6378 0.6811 1 0.6687 0.8297 0.9443 
infrast
ructur
al 
vulner
ability   
number of gas station 
per km2 
0.8474 1 0.8780 0.5236 0.8708 0.5502 0.1825 0.2864 0.2299 0.1395 0.2612 0 0.0059 0.0845 0.0206 0.0252 
econo
mical 
vulner
ability     
the reciprocal of 
regional GDP per 
capita 
0.0388 0 0.1676 0.1555 0.5882 0.4298 0.5396 0.7225 0.1111 0.9665 1 0.6529 0.4768 0.6731 0.6527 0.9783 
unemployment rate 0.2583 0.2376 0.0094 0.0359 0.1753 0.4056 0.4177 0.0925 0.0749 0 0.0285 1 0.3380 0.2767 0.1688 0.4358 
adapt
abilit
y    
emplo
yee's 
assura
nce       
number of employees 
joined medical 
assurance    
0.5044 0.3278 0 0.0820 0.7470 0.9195 0.9282 0.8553 0.8337 0.8906 0.8640 0.9828 0.9708 0.9796 0.9758 1 
number of employees 
joined unemployment 
insurance 
0.5469 0.3689 0 0.0887 0.7582 0.9140 0.9131 0.8844 0.8307 0.8800 0.8658 0.9639 0.9545 0.9678 0.9650 1 
 protec
tion      
investment of 
infrastructure 
0.8303 0.9379 0 0.6331 0.5094 0.9043 0.6584 0.6934 0.8121 0.7545 0.8144 0.9017 0.9633 1 0.8610 0.9774 
number of medical 
staff per thousand 
people 
0 0.0980 0.7200 0.8774 0.9076 0.7252 0.8651 0.9969 0.9519 1 0.9680 0.7468 0.8712 0.8460 0.9119 0.9285 
number of hospital 
beds per thousand 
people 
0 0.0737 0.7241 0.9153 0.8008 0.6375 0.6703 1 0.9313 0.7092 0.8267 0.3934 0.8257 0.7729 0.9462 0.9442 
safety 
contr
ol    
super
visio
n 
regula
tory 
capaci
ty        
coverage rate of 
supervision 
1 0.8854 0.0154 0.9064 0.9740 0.8552 0.6842 0.7684 0.5789 0.6865 0 0.5013 0.5491 0.6325 0.6703 0.9131 
economic punishment   0.9998 0.9073 0 0.6456 0.8324 0.9854 0.8639 0.5802 0.7384 0.9598 0.6204 0.8659 0.9821 0.9915 1 0.9378 
punishment rate of 
supervision   
0.9044 0.5679 0.9474 0.8614 0.8078 0.9293 0.779 0.4704 0 0.9283 1 0.9197 0.8384 0.9656 0.9990 0.8824 
perso
nnel 
alloca
tion       
crew size of security 
supervision system 
0.62 0.32 0.34 0.58 0.52 1 0.12 0.56 0.68 0 0.16 0.74 0.8 0.92 0.76 0.8 
number of people 
attending the 
inspection    
0.8765 0.2560 0 0.8429 0.2910 0.7108 0.7619 1 0.9038 0.4813 0.2326 0.8788 0.8319 0.9607 0.8422 0.9023 
*capacity of the safety 
supervision crew 
(0,0.7,
0.3,0,
0) 
(0,0.5,
0.5,0,
0) 
(0.2,0.
8,0,0,
0) 
(0,0.2,
0.8,0,
0) 
(0,0.4,
0.6,0,
0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,0,0.
8,0.2,
0) 
(0,0.3,
0.7,0,
0) 
(0,0.6,
0.4,0,
0) 
(0,0.5,
0.5,0,
0) 
(0,0,0.
8,0.2,
0) 
(0,0,0.
7,0.3,
0) 
(0,0,0,
0.8,0.
2) 
(0,0,0.
5,0.5,
0) 
(0,0,0.
7,0.3,
0) 
(0,0,0,
0.9,0.
1) 
emer
gency 
mana
geme
nt & 
publi
city    
emerg
ency 
capaci
ty       
number of fire brigade  0.6667 0.6667 0 0.2778 0.5 0.8889 0.9444 0.8333 0.6667 0.7222 0.5556 1 0.8889 0.9444 1 0.8333 
emergency resources 
reserves   
0.2455 0.0864 0.0910 0.3182 0.2364 0.5364 0.5272 0.3091 0.2455 0.5546 0 0.6909 0.5501 0.6909 0.6228 1 
safety 
propa
ganda        
number of news 
manuscripts about 
industrial safety   
0.8987 0.6389 0.2377 0.2788 0.4333 0.8987 1 0.8235 0.4223 0 0.9739 0.6028 0.3902 0.1324 0.1715 0.7934 
*the level of public 
safety awareness 
(0,0.8,
0.2,0,
0) 
(0,0.7,
0.3,0,
0) 
(0,0.9,
0.1,0,
0) 
(0,0.6,
0.4,0,
0) 
(0,0.5,
0.5,0,
0) 
(0,0.4,
0.6,0,
0) 
(0,0.5,
0.5,0,
0) 
(0,0.7,
0.3,0,
0) 
(0,0.5,
0.5,0,
0) 
(0,0.8,
0.2,0,
0) 
(0,0.3,
0.7,0,
0) 
(0,0.4,
0.6,0,
0) 
(0,0.5,
0.5,0,
0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,0.5,
0.5,0,
0) 
(0,0.4,
0.6,0,
0) 
 
  
 Supporting information 
S3 Table. Fuzzy Belief Structure 
lvl 1 lvl 2 lvl 3 level 4 A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P 
disaster
-
inducin
g 
factors   
 
accid
ents   
S 
death toll of 
industrial safety 
issues 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,0.91
,0.09,0
,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,1,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(0.94,0
.06,0,0
,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(0.46,0
.54,0,0
,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
frequency of 
industrial safety 
issues 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,0.73
,0.27,0
,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0.01,0
.99,0,0
,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(0.56,0
.44,0,0
,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(0.25,0
.75,0,0
,0) 
(0.84,
0.16,0
,0,0) 
A 
number of 
people 
investigated and 
affixed liability 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(0.1,0.
9,0,0,0
) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,1,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(0.47,0
.53,0,0
,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(0.47,0
.53,0,0
,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
the fines 
(0.77,0
.23,0,0
,0) 
(0,1,0,
0,0) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0.95
,0.05,0
,0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,1,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(0,1,0,
0,0) 
(0,0.77
,0.23,0
,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
hidde
n 
dange
rs 
number of major hazard 
sources 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(0.63,0
.37,0,0
,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0.51,0
.49,0,0
,0) 
(0.23,0
.77,0,0
,0) 
(0.96,0
.04,0,0
,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
number of hidden 
dangers discovered 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(0,0.79
,0.21,0
,0) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0.5,0.
5,0,0,0
) 
(0,0.9,
0.1,0,0
) 
(0.45,0
.55,0,0
,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(0,1,0,
0,0) 
(0,1,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(0.88,
0.12,0
,0,0) 
number of units with 
harm of occupational 
disease 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(0.52,0
.48,0,0
,0) 
(0,0,0,
0.21,0.
79) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,0.26
,0.74,0
,0) 
(0.7,0.
3,0,0,0
) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,0,0,
0.36,0.
64) 
(0.64,0
.36,0,0
,0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,0.06
,0.94,0
,0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
number of people 
contacted with 
occupational disease 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(0.17,0
.83,0,0
,0) 
(0,0,0.
83,0.1
7,0) 
(0,0.35
,0.65,0
,0) 
(0.28,0
.72,0,0
,0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,0,0,
1,0) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(0,1,0,
0,0) 
(0,1,0,
0,0) 
(0.08,
0.92,0
,0,0) 
vulnera
bility 
of 
hazard-
affecte
d 
carriers 
vulne
rabilit
y 
PV 
the resident 
population 
densit 
(0,0,0,
0.74,0.
26) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0.77
,0.23,0
,0) 
(0,0.82
,0.18,0
,0) 
(0,1,0,
0,0) 
(0,1,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
proportion of 
aged population 
(0,0,0,
0.87,0.
13) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,1,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(0,0.19
,0.81,0
,0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,1,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(0,0,0,
1,0) 
(0,0.25
,0.75,0
,0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
proportion of 
children 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(0.01,0
.99,0,0
,0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,1,0,
0,0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,1,0,
0,0) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0.38
,0.62,0
,0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,0,0.
62,0.3
8,0) 
(0,0,0.
19,0.8
1,0) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0.
31,0.6
9,0) 
(0,0,0,
0.83,0.
17) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
IV 
number of gas 
station per km2  
(0,0,0,
0.69,0.
31) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0.36,0.
64) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,0,0,
0.45,0.
55) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0.1,0.
9,0,0,0
) 
(0,1,0,
0,0) 
(0,1,0,
0,0) 
(0.43,0
.57,0,0
,0) 
(0,1,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
 EV 
the reciprocal of 
regional GDP 
per capita 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(0.19,0
.81,0,0
,0) 
(0.29,0
.71,0,0
,0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,0,0,
1,0) 
(0.8,0.
2,0,0,0
) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0.
47,0.5
3,0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,0,0.
27,0.7
3,0) 
(0,0,0.
47,0.5
3,0) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
unemployment 
rate 
(0,1,0,
0,0) 
(0,1,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(0.14,0
.86,0,0
,0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0.62
,0.38,0
,0) 
(0,1,0,
0,0) 
(0.18,0
.82,0,0
,0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
adapt
abilit
y    
EA 
number of 
employees 
joined medical 
assurance 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,0.72
,0.28,0
,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(0,0,0,
1,0) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0.62,0.
38) 
(0,0,0,
0.8,0.2
) 
(0,0,0,
0.17,0.
83) 
(0,0,0,
0.53,0.
47) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
number of 
employees 
joined 
unemployment 
insurance 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,0.31
,0.69,0
,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(0,0,0,
1,0) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0.27,0.
73) 
(0,0,0,
0.82,0.
18) 
(0,0,0,
0.33,0.
67) 
(0,0,0,
0.51,0.
49) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
P      
investment of 
infrastructure   
0.3333 
(0,0,0,
0.82,0.
18) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(0,0,0.
67,0.3
3,0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0.
42,0.5
8,0) 
(0,0,0.
07,0.9
3,0) 
(0,0,0,
0.94,0.
06) 
(0,0,0,
1,0) 
(0,0,0,
0.92,0.
08) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0.56,0.
44) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
number of 
medical staff 
per thousand 
people 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(0,0,0,
1,0) 
(0,0,0,
0.37,0.
63) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
1,0) 
(0,0,0,
0.52,0.
48) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
1,0) 
(0,0,0,
0.45,0.
55) 
(0,0,0,
0.7,0.3
) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
number of 
hospital beds 
per thousand 
people 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(0,0,0,
1,0) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
1,0) 
(0,0,0.
63,0.3
7,0) 
(0,0,0.
3,0.7,0
) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
1,0) 
(0,0,0,
0.85,0.
15) 
(0,0.07
,0.93,0
,0) 
(0,0,0,
0.85,0.
15) 
(0,0,0,
1,0) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
safety 
control    
super
visio
n 
RC        
coverage rate of 
supervision   
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0.25,0.
75) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0.62,0.
38) 
(0,0,0.
16,0.8
4) 
(0,0,0,
1,0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,0,0.
14,0.8
6,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,0,0.
67,0.3
3,0) 
(0,0,0.
3,0.7,0
) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
economic 
punishment   
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(0,0,0.
54,0.4
6,0) 
(0,0,0,
0.81,0.
19) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0.53,0.
47) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,0,0,
1,0) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0.
8,0.2,0
) 
(0,0,0,
0.51,0.
49) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
punishment rate 
of supervision   
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0.56,0.
44) 
(0,0,0,
0.96,0.
04) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
1,0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0.76,0.
24) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0.3,0.
7) 
PA       
crew size of 
safety 
supervision 
system   
(0,0,0.
8,0.2,0
) 
(0,0.8,
0.2,0,0
) 
(0,0.6,
0.4,0,0
) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0.67,0
.33,0,0
,0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,0,0.
2,0.8,0
) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(0.25,0
.75,0,0
,0) 
(0,0,0,
1,0) 
(0,0,0,
1,0) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
1,0) 
(0,0,0,
1,0) 
number of 
people 
attending the 
inspection    
(0,0,0,
0.38,0.
62) 
(0,1,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(0,0,0,
0.73,0.
27) 
(0,1,0,
0,0) 
(0,0,0,
1,0) 
(0,0,0,
1,0) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,1,0,
0,0) 
(0,0,0,
0.35,0.
65) 
(0,0,0,
0.81,0.
19) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0.73,0.
27) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
 *capacity of the 
safety 
supervision 
crew 
(0.5,0.
4,0.1,0
,0) 
(0.3,0.
6,0.1,0
,0) 
(0.4,0.
4,0.2,0
,0) 
(0.3,0.
5,0.1,0
.1,0) 
(0.2,0.
6,0.2,0
,0) 
(0.1,0.
5,0.3,0
.1,0) 
(0.1,0.
6,0.3,0
,0） 
(0.4,0.
4,0.1,0
.1,0) 
(0.2,0.
6,0.2,0
,0) 
(0.2,0.
4,0.3,0
.1,0) 
(0.2,0.
4,0.3,0
.1,0) 
(0.1,0.
5,0.3,0
.1,0) 
(0.2,0.
5,0.2,0
.1,0) 
(0.1,0.
5,0.3,0
.1,0) 
(0.1,0.
6,0.2,0
.1,0) 
(0.1,0.
5,0.3,
0.1,0) 
emer
gency 
mana
geme
nt & 
publi
city 
EC       
number of fire 
brigade   
(0,0,0.
33,0.6
7,0) 
(0,0,0.
33,0.6
7,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(0,1,0,
0,0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,0,0,
0.2,0.8
) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0.8,0.2
) 
(0,0,0.
33,0.6
7,0) 
(0,0,0,
1,0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0.2,0.8
) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0.8,0.
2) 
emergency 
resources 
reserves   
(0,1,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(0,0.82
,0.18,0
,0) 
(0,1,0,
0,0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,0.91
,0.09,0
,0) 
(0,1,0,
0,0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(0,0,0.
09,0.9
1,0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,0,0.
09,0.9
1,0) 
(0,0,0.
77,0.2
3,0) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
SP 
number of news 
manuscripts 
about industrial 
safety  
(0,0,0,
0.03,0.
97) 
(0,0,0.
61,0.3
9,0) 
(0,1,0,
0,0) 
(0,1,0,
0,0) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(0,0,0,
0.03,0.
97) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0,
0.87,0.
13) 
(0,0,1,
0,0) 
(1,0,0,
0,0) 
(0,0,0,
0,1) 
(0,0,0.
97,0.0
3,0) 
(0,0.1,
0.9,0,0
) 
(0.51,0
.49,0,0
,0) 
(0.17,0
.83,0,0
,0) 
(0,0,0,
1,0) 
*the level of 
public safety 
awareness   
(0.4,0.
4,0.1,0
.1,0) 
(0.4,0.
4,0.2,0
,0) 
(0.2,0.
6,0.2,0
,0) 
(0.3,0.
5,0.2,0
,0) 
(0,0.5,
0.4,0,0
.1) 
(0.1,0.
6,0.2,0
.1,0) 
(0.1,0.
5,0.3,0
.1,0) 
(0.1,0.
6,0.2,0
.1,0) 
(0.1,0.
4,0.4,0
.1,0) 
(0,0.5,
0.4,0,0
.1) 
(0,0.4,
0.4,0.1
,0.1) 
(0,0.4,
0.5,0,0
.1) 
(0,0.4,
0.5,0,0
.1) 
(0,0.4,
0.5,0,0
.1) 
(0,0.4,
0.5,0,0
.1) 
(0,0.5,
0.4,0,
0.1) 
 
  
 Supporting information 5 
S5 Questionnaire in English 
Questionnaire of Indexes’ Weights and Qualitative Indexes’ data in the Assessment of Risk of Regional Industrial Safety (RIS) in 
Beijing 
 
Hello, this questionnaire is designed to assess the indexes’ weights in the assessment of risk of regional industrial safety in Beijing. Because of your rich experience of Beijing 
industrial safety, we invite you to take part in this questionnaire to give grades to assess the importance of each index in the index system. Please follow the guidance of this 
questionnaire and give your opinion of the grade of importance of each index. Many thanks for your help! 
 
This questionnaire is made up by 3 parts, please do not leave out any one, thanks! 
 
Part 1 Overview of the index system 
Take the data availability and the situation of industrial safety of Beijing into consideration, we make the index system of assessing the risk of RIS of Beijing, as follows, 
Table 1. The Index System of Industrial Safety Comprehensive Risk 
level 1 level 2 level 3 level 4 
disaster-
inducing factors   
 accidents 
severity  
death toll of industrial safety issues 
frequency of industrial safety issues 
accountability 
number of people investigated and affixed liability  
the fines of industrial safety accidents  
hidden dangers    
number of major hazard sources 
number of hidden dangers discovered 
number of units with harm of occupational disease 
number of people contacted with occupational disease 
vulnerability of 
hazard-affected 
carriers 
vulnerability 
population vulnerability 
the resident population density 
proportion of aged population 
proportion of children 
infrastructural vulnerability  number of gas station per km2  
economical vulnerability 
the reciprocal of regional GDP per capita 
unemployment rate  
adaptability 
employee's assurance  
(-)number of employees joined medical assurance 
(-)number of employees joined unemployment insurance 
protection (-)investment of infrastructure 
 (-)number of medical staff per thousand people 
(-)number of hospital beds per thousand people 
safety control 
supervision    
regulatory capacity 
(-)coverage rate of supervision  
(-)economic punishment 
(-)punishment rate of supervision 
personnel allocation  
(-)crew size of safety supervision system 
(-)number of people attending the inspection  
(-)*capacity of the safety supervision crew 
emergency 
management & 
publicity    
emergency capacity 
(-)number of fire brigade 
(-)emergency resources reserves 
safety propaganda  
(-)number of news manuscripts about industrial safety 
(-)*the level of public safety awareness 
* symbolizes the qualitative indexes 
(-) symbolizes the negative indexes 
 
Part 2 Rating of index importance 
Please rate the index importance using your rich experience in Beijing industrial safety, and the importance grades are showed in table 2. 
 Notice: index importance means the capability of influencing the corresponding upper level index. The more the index can influence the corresponding upper level index, 
the larger the index importance grade is. 
Table 2. Index Importance Grades 
   
Definition of different importance levels Importance Grades 
Not important 1 
Slightly important 3 
Quite important 5 
Obviously important 7 
Absolutely important 9 
Between them 2, 4, 6, 8 
*note: Please refer to Table 1 when you fill in the blanks to consider the hierarchy of index system. 
 
Please fill the importance grades in all the coloured blanks with making a comparison of the indexes of the same branch (with the same colour) and the same level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 level 1 
Importance 
Grade level 2 
Importance 
Grade level 3 
Importance 
Grade level 4 
Importance 
Grade 
disaster-
inducing 
factors   
 
 accidents  
severity   
death toll of industrial safety issues  
frequency of industrial safety issues  
accountability  
number of people investigated and affixed liability   
the fines of industrial safety accidents   
hidden 
dangers    
 
number of major hazard sources  
number of hidden dangers discovered  
number of units with harm of occupational disease  
number of people contacted with occupational disease  
vulnerability 
of hazard-
affected 
carriers 
 
vulnerability  
population 
vulnerability 
 
the resident population density  
proportion of aged population  
proportion of children  
infrastructural 
vulnerability  
 
number of gas station per km2  ------- 
economical 
vulnerability 
 
the reciprocal of regional GDP per capita  
unemployment rate   
adaptability  
employee's 
assurance  
 
(-)number of employees joined medical assurance  
(-)number of employees joined unemployment insurance  
protection  
(-)investment of infrastructure  
(-)number of medical staff per thousand people  
(-)number of hospital beds per thousand people  
safety 
control 
 
supervision     
regulatory 
capacity 
 
(-)coverage rate of supervision   
(-)economic punishment  
(-)punishment rate of supervision  
personnel 
allocation  
 
(-)crew size of safety supervision system  
(-)number of people attending the inspection   
(-)*capacity of the safety supervision crew  
emergency 
management 
& publicity    
 
emergency 
capacity 
 
(-)number of fire brigade  
(-)emergency resources reserves  
safety 
propaganda  
 
(-)number of news manuscripts about industrial safety  
(-)*the level of public safety awareness  
 
 
 Part 3 Grading of qualitative indexes 
Please give your opinion on grading the following two qualitative indexes with choosing the grade from 1 to 5 (1 means very low, 5 means very High, 3 means average). 
 
district *capacity of the safety supervision crew *the level of public safety awareness 
Dongcheng □1  □2  □3  □4  □5 □1  □2  □3  □4  □5 
Xicheng □1  □2  □3  □4  □5 □1  □2  □3  □4  □5 
Chaoyang □1  □2  □3  □4  □5 □1  □2  □3  □4  □5 
Haidian □1  □2  □3  □4  □5 □1  □2  □3  □4  □5 
Fengtai □1  □2  □3  □4  □5 □1  □2  □3  □4  □5 
Shijingshan □1  □2  □3  □4  □5 □1  □2  □3  □4  □5 
Fangshan □1  □2  □3  □4  □5 □1  □2  □3  □4  □5 
Tongzhou □1  □2  □3  □4  □5 □1  □2  □3  □4  □5 
Shunyi □1  □2  □3  □4  □5 □1  □2  □3  □4  □5 
Changping □1  □2  □3  □4  □5 □1  □2  □3  □4  □5 
Daxing □1  □2  □3  □4  □5 □1  □2  □3  □4  □5 
Mentougou □1  □2  □3  □4  □5 □1  □2  □3  □4  □5 
Huairou □1  □2  □3  □4  □5 □1  □2  □3  □4  □5 
Pinggu □1  □2  □3  □4  □5 □1  □2  □3  □4  □5 
Miyun □1  □2  □3  □4  □5 □1  □2  □3  □4  □5 
Yanqing □1  □2  □3  □4  □5 □1  □2  □3  □4  □5 
 
  
 Supporting information 6 
S6 Questionnaire Data 
Part 1 Importance Grade of Each Index 
Num. of Experts 
Importance Grade 
Average 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X 
Level 1 
disaster-inducing factors 8 9 7 7 9 9 7 9 8 7 8.0000 
vulnerability of hazard-affected carriers 9 7 3 8 7 9 5 9 8 7 7.0000 
safety control 7 7 5 6 9 7 6 8 8 7 7.0000 
Level 2 
accidents 7 9 5 8 9 7 8 9 9 8 8.0000 
hidden dangers 8 9 9 9 5 9 9 9 8 7 8.2222 
vulnerability 6 7 5 8 7 9 5 9 6 8 7.1111 
adaptability 7 5 3 8 5 7 7 8 7 6 6.2222 
supervision 7 9 7 5 9 7 7 8 7 6 7.2222 
emergency management & publicity 8 7 5 9 7 7 5 9 6 6 6.7778 
Level 3 
severity 8 7 3 9 9 9 8 9 9 8 7.8889 
accountability 9 5 5 1 5 7 6 7 9 8 5.8889 
population vulnerability 7 7 3 6 9 7 8 8 6 5 6.5556 
infrastracture vulnerability 9 7 5 9 5 7 6 9 6 6 6.6667 
economical vulnerability 7 7 3 8 7 7 7 7 6 4 6.2222 
employee's assurance 8 5 3 6 5 7 5 7 6 4 5.3333 
protection 9 5 5 9 7 7 7 8 6 5 6.5556 
regulatory capacity 9 7 7 5 7 7 7 8 6 5 6.5556 
personnel allocation 8 9 5 5 9 7 7 9 6 5 6.8889 
emergency capacity 8 7 5 9 7 7 7 9 7 6 7.1111 
safety propaganda 9 7 5 9 5 9 5 9 6 6 6.7778 
Level 4 
death toll of industrial safety issues 9 7 1 9 9 7 9 9 9 7 7.4444 
frequency of industrial safety issues 9 5 5 1 9 9 7 8 7 6 6.3333 
 number of people investigated and affixed liability 9 5 5 1 7 9 7 7 5 4 5.5556 
the fines of industrial safety accidents 8 3 3 7 7 5 7 5 5 4 5.1111 
number of major hazard sources 8 9 5 1 5 9 8 8 7 5 6.3333 
number of hidden dangers discovered 8 7 3 2 5 7 9 5 7 4 5.4444 
number of units with harm of occupational disease 7 7 3 8 7 9 6 7 7 5 6.5556 
number of people contacted with occupational disease 8 5 5 3 7 7 7 3 8 4 5.4444 
the resident population density 6 5 5 8 7 9 7 9 7 5 6.8889 
proportion of aged population 6 3 1 5 5 7 8 7 6 5 5.2222 
proportion of children 5 5 1 5 5 7 9 8 6 5 5.6667 
the reciprocal of regional GDP per capita 8 5 3 9 5 5 3 7 5 4 5.1111 
unemployment rate 6 7 5 8 7 7 5 7 6 3 6.1111 
number of employees joined medical assurance 7 9 5 7 5 7 8 8 5 3 6.3333 
number of employees joined unemployment insurance 7 9 3 5 5 7 6 7 5 3 5.5556 
investment of infrastructure 8 7 5 9 5 7 7 7 6 5 6.4444 
number of medical staff per thousand people 7 7 3 8 7 7 6 7 6 4 6.1111 
number of hospital beds per thousand people 8 5 3 8 7 7 6 7 6 4 5.8889 
coverage rate of supervision 8 5 7 2 9 9 8 8 6 4 6.4444 
economic punishment 9 5 3 9 7 7 5 8 5 4 5.8889 
punishment rate of supervision 9 5 3 9 7 7 6 7 5 3 5.7778 
crew size of safety supervision system 7 5 7 4 9 7 6 9 7 5 6.5556 
number of people attending the inspection 6 5 3 3 7 5 7 9 6 4 5.4444 
capacity of the safety supervision crew 6 5 5 8 7 7 8 9 7 6 6.8889 
number of fire brigade 7 5 5 9 7 7 8 9 6 5 6.7778 
emergency resources reserves 6 5 3 8 5 5 5 9 6 5 5.6667 
number of news manuscripts about industrial safety 7 5 3 9 7 9 5 9 5 5 6.3333 
the level of public safety awareness 8 9 3 9 5 9 7 9 6 6 7.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Part 2 Qualitative Index Data 
1. capacity of the safety supervision crew 
Num. 
of 
Expert
s 
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P 
I 5 4 5 4 5 3 4 5 5 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 
II 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
III 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
IV 4 4 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
V 5 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
VI 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 5 4 5 5 4 5 4 4 4 
VII 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
VIII 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
IX 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
X 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 3 4 3 
FBS 
(0,0,0.
1,0.4,0
.5) 
(0,0,0.
1,0.6,0
.3) 
(0,0,0.
2,0.4,0
.4) 
(0,0.1,0
.1,0.5,0.
3) 
(0,0,0.
2,0.6,0
.2) 
(0,0.1,0
.3,0.5,0.
1) 
(0,0,0.
3,0.6,0
.1) 
(0,0.1,0
.1,0.4,0.
4) 
(0,0.2,
0.6,0.2
） 
(0,0.1,0
.3,0.4,0.
2) 
(0,0.1,0
.3,0.4,0.
2) 
(0,0.1,0
.3,0.5,0.
1) 
(0,0.1,0
.2,0.5,0.
2) 
(0,0.1,0
.3,0.5,0.
1) 
(0,0.1,0
.2,0.6,0.
1) 
(0,0.1,0
.3,0.5,0.
1) 
 
2. the level of public safety awareness 
Num. 
of 
Experts 
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P 
I 4 4 3 5 3 4 4 4 3 4 2 3 3 3 3 4 
II 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
III 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
IV 2 4 4 3 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
V 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
VI 5 5 4 4 3 4 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
VII 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
VIII 5 5 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
IX 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
X 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 FBS 
(0,0.1,0.
1,0.4,0.
4) 
(0,0,0.
2,0.4,0.
4) 
(0,0,0.
2,0.6,0.
2) 
(0,0,0.
2,0.5,0.
3) 
(0.1,0,
0.4,0.5,
0) 
(0,0.1,0.
2,0.6,0.
1) 
(0,0.1,0.
3,0.5,0.
1) 
(0,0.1,0.
2,0.6,0.
1) 
(0,0.1,0.
4,0,4,0.
1) 
(0.1,0,
0.4,0.5,
0) 
(0.1,0.1,
0.4,0.4,
0) 
(0.1,0,
0.5,0.4,
0) 
(0.1,0,
0.5,0.4,
0) 
(0.1,0,
0.5,0.4,
0) 
(0.1,0,
0.5,0.4,
0) 
(0.1,0,
0.4,0.5,
0) 
 
